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CORPORATE EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF, OR
AGAINST POLITICAL CANDIDATES: HAS THE
LEGAL LANDSCAPE CHANGED AFTER THE BCRA
AND CITIZENS UNITED?
by
Glen M. Vogel*

"I think we are at a very critical time in
this country. I can tell you beyond a
shadow of a doubt that uh, the Hillary
Clinton that I know is not equipped, not
qualified to be our commander in chief " 1

The public's ability to discuss and debate the character
and fitness of presidential candidates is at the core of the First
Amendment's prohibition that, "Confess shall make no law ..
. abridging the Freedom of Speech." Despite the existence of
this fundamental right, articulated so eloquently in our
founding document, in November 2002, Congress made
political speech a felony for one class of speakers corporations and unions.3

*Glen M. Vogel , Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal
Studies in the Hofstra University Zarb School of Business. He
would like to acknowledge and thank the Zarb School of
Business for its generous summer grant to support the research
efforts associated with this article. Gratitude also is extended
to Jonathan Vecchi , Paul Johnson, and Eleanor Sharkey for
their valuable research contributions.
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Under the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform
Law ("McCain Feingold law"), corporations and unions faced
monetary penalties and up to five years in prison for
broadcasting candidate-related advocacy during federal
4
elections.
Outlawing political speech based on the identity of the
speaker appears to collide with the fundamental principles set
forth in the First Amendment. On January 10, 20 I 0, the United
States Supreme Court addressed this collision in Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission. 5
In one of the most controversial decisions in decades
the Supreme Court, in Citizens United, invalidated the portions'
of the McCain-Feingold law that dealt directly with corporate
expenditures in support of political candidates. 6 This decision
set off an eruption of political debate and fierce partisanship. 7
Some legal scholars and journalists called the decision
and claimed _the decision was made in " bad
faith.
Still others charactenzed Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion as "more like the ranting of a right-wing talk show host
than the rational view of a justice with a sense of political
9
realism." The New York Times, in several editorials, blasted
the Court and called the decision "disastrous," 10 "terrible,""
an d " rec kl ess. "1 2 In &:tact, th e dectsiOn sparked so much
controversy that President Obama "called out" the Court and
specifically referred to Citizens United during his State of the
Union Address in January 2009. 13 According to President
Obama, "the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I
believe will open the floodgates for special interests including foreign corporations - to spend without limit in our
elections.
I don't think American elections should be
bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by
foreign entities .... " 14
0

new questions and concerns from corporations who were
unsure about how this decision impacted the rules governing
the area of corporate expenditures and it left many companies
afraid to run afoul of the law since there are criminal penalties
at stake. 15 Businesses are afraid to use their funds in support of
candidates since they are unsure what, if anything, the Court
invalidated and what restrictions remain in place when it comes
to corporations expending their own funds in support of
political parties and/or campaigns.
In order to effectively analyze the impact of the Court's
holding in this controversial 5-4 decision, this article will
discuss the following: Part I will discuss the case law and
regulatory history of campaign finance law in the United States
over the past one-hundred years; Part II will look at the
campaign finance law at issue in Citizens United (the McCainFeingold law) and some of its critical components; Part III will
look at the background of the Citizens Un ited case and the
Court's holding along with some of its practical implications;
Part IV will examine some lesser discussed aspects of the
decision as well as the issues that have been misinterpreted by
the media; and Part V will offer some conclusions.

0

The Court's decision in Citizens United unleashed a
torrential wave of criticism from the media along with raising

A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

Citizens United was not the first time that the issue of
corporate involvement in federal campaigns was debated by
16
d
litigants or addressed by Congress. CorporatiOns an umons
have long faced limits on direct contributions to political
campaigns. 17 The first restrictions on corporate involvement in
18
the political process goes back more than a century and was
enacted to limit what sponsors considered to be the corporate
19
corrupting influence on the political marketplace.
0

0
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The start of the 20'h century, often identified as the
20
gilded age , is known as a period of enormous economic and
industrial growth in America. The largest and most influential
businesses at the time were railroads, banks, and steel
companies owned by the super-rich industrialists and financiers
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W.
Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Flagler, and J.P. Morgan. 2 1
All of these men were attacked as "robber barons" by critics,
who believed they cheated to get their money and that, because
of their wealth, they were able to gain tremendous influence
over politicians, Congress, and even the Presidency. 22
The concept of having Congress address the problem of
corporate political influence all started with President
Theodore Roosevelt's State of the Union address after the 1904
23
election.
Roosevelt was outspoken in his opposition to
corporate influence on politics and suggested an outright ban
on all contributions by corporations to avoid even the
appearance of corruption or influence. 24 Two years later, in
1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which prohibited
corporations from making any contributions for the purposes of
influencing a federal election's outcome. 25 While banning
political contributions to candidates, the Tillman Act was silent
on the issue of corporations expending their funds on their own
in support of or against a candidate. 26 An independent
expenditure is money spent by a corporation or union in
support of a candidate in a manner uncoordinated with any
political party or the candidate himself. 27
While direct contributions to candidates by corporations
have been illegal since 1907, it was not until 1947 and the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress specifically
prohibited independent expenditures made in support of a
candidate by a corporation or labor union. 28 Immediately after
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, President Harry S.
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Truman questioned its constitutionality, particularly the
independent contributions ban, when he vetoed the bill stating
29
The bill
that it was a, "dangerous intrusion on free speech. "
eventually passed despite the President's opposition, and it did
not take long for the Supreme Court to comment on the validity
30
of the statute's new restrictions on corporate expenditures. In
31
1948, in United States v. Cl0 , the Court did not specifically
address the constitutionality of the independent expenditure
ban; however, four justices in dissent remarked that they had
"the gravest doubt" about the constitutionality of the
prohibition. 32 Almost a decade later, in United States v.
Automobile Workers, the Court would take a closer look at the
constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Act's corporate
expenditure ban. 33 Here, even though the court held that the
expenditure ban, as-applied to the specific facts of the case,
appropriately prohibited a union television broadcast that
specifically advocated for congressional candidates, the Court
never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of the statute as
a whole. 34 Again, in dissent, three justices argued that the
Court should have addressed the constitutional question and,
had it done so, they would have found the ban on independent
35
expenditures unconstitutional. Justice Douglas, in his dissent
in the Automobile Workers case stated that:
Some may think that one group or another
should not express its views in an election
because it is too powerful, because it advocates
unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of
lawless action. But these are not justifications
for withholding First Amendment rights from
any group - labor or corporate .... First
Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all
persons and groups in this country. They are
not to be dispensed or withheld merely because
we or the Congress thinks the person or group is
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worthy or unworthy. 36
Over the next two decades, the constitutionality of the ban on
expenditures would get bantered about or commented upon in
dicta, but it would never be fully addressed by the courts. 37
After the Watergate scandal in the early 1970' s,
Congress took another look at the myriad of issues surrounding
the federal campaign finance system and attempted to resolve
those issues with the passage of several amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA "). 38 FECA,
originally passed in 1971, along with its 1974 Amendments, is
essentially the foundation upon which the most recent
campaign finance laws were built. 39 FECA, among other
things, established new contribution limits for individuals
political parties, and political action committees ("PACs") and'
established filing requirements for both contributions and
40
While controversial 41 , the 1974 Amendments
expenditures.
to FECA were Congress 's attempt to restore the public's
confidence in the integrity of the electoral system and to
remedy the loopholes and problems that were identified after
42
the Watergate scandal.
Essentially, FECA imposed three
different restrictions on corporations ' and labor unions ' efforts
43
to influence elections. They imposed contribution limitations
and banned independent expenditures 44 , they imposed
fundraising restrictions, and they limited the contributions to
45
political committees and PACs. They also imposed disclosure
requirements on P ACs for contributions based on the amount
contributed, the nature of the contributor, and the
contribution's proximity to an election. 46

Buckley v. Valeo
Shortly after FECA was amended, the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the new statutory limitations
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on campaign contributions and expenditures in Buckley v.
Valeo.47 In Buckley, the Court was asked to address three
major issues: the constitutionality of the limits on direct
contributions to candidates, the constitutionality of the
independent expenditure ban, and the constitutionality of the
48
When the Court examined the
disclosure requirements.
provision limiting the amount an individual may expend in
support or defeat of a particular candidate, it held, " the
governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify .. . [the
49
The Court
statute's] ceiling on independent expenditures."
remarked, "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.. .. " 50 Based upon this First Amendment analysis,
the Court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the
51
limitation on independent expenditures was unconstitutional.
The Court pointed out that, "the independent expenditure
ceiling . .. fails to serve any substantial governmental interest
in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the
electoral process." 52 Oddly, even though the Court invalidated
the independent expenditure limitation provlSlon for
individuals, it did not consider the constitutionality of the
separate ban on corporate and umon independent
.
53
expendttures.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
Less than two years after Buckley, the Court struck
down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures related to referenda issues in the case of First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.54 In Bellotti, two national
banking associations and three business corporations wanted to
spend money to publicize their position on a proposed state
constitutional amendment that would have permitted the
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legislature to impose a graduated individual income tax. 55 The
statute at issue prohibited the corporations from making
contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of . . .
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to
. or corporate offiIcer, director,
.
th e vo t ers.. .. ,s6 A ny corporatiOn
or agent who violated the statute could be subject to a
monetary fine and up to a year imprisonment. 57 The Supreme
Court rejected the state statute's prohibition of corporate
expenditures related to issue advocacy on the principle that the
government does not have the power to ban corporations from
speaking on political issues. 58
"We thus find no support in the First
Amendment . .. or in the decisions ofthis Court
for the proposition that speech that otherwise '
would be within the protection of the First
Amendment loses that protection simply because
its source is a corporation . . .." 59
While the Bellotti decision did not address the constitutionality
of the State's ban on corporate independent expenditures in
support of individual candidates, the Supreme Court has
offered that had the issue been analyzed, it would have
invalidated the ban on the premise that the First Amendment
does not permit restrictions on political speech merely because
the speaker is a corporation. 60

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
It was not until 1990, in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce 61 , that the Court finally addressed the
issue of corporate independent expenditures head-on.
In
Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use its
general treasury funds to run an advertisement in a local
newspaper in support of a candidate who was attempting to fill
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62

a vacancy in the Michigan House of Representatives. Section
54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited
corporations from making contributions and independent
63
expenditures in connection with state candidate elections.
Worse yet, any vi?lation of the_ prohibition on co rporate
6
independent expenditures was pumshable as a felony.
The
Chamber of Commerce initiated an action seeking injunctive
relief against enforcement of the Act claiming the prohibition
on corporate independent expenditures was unconstitutional
65
and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
While the Buckley and Bellotti cases were not
controlling - because neither case directly addressed the
constitutionality of prohibiting corporate independent
expenditures in support of a candidate - the Austin Court
circumvented the traditional First Amendment analysis utilized
in those cases and identified a new governmental interest in
66
The
limiting political speech: an anti-distortion interest.
Court posited that the Michigan statute at issue was aimed at a
"different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form .... " 67 The Court held that, corporate wealth could unfairly
influence elections when it is used in the form of independent
expenditures, and as such, the State had a "sufficiently
68
compelling rationale to support its restriction .... "
Before Austin, the Supreme Court had never held that
Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political
69
Thus, the
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.
Court's decision in Austin was at odds with the longstanding
position that believing a particular group "too powerful" is not
a basis upon which to deny or withhold First Amendment
70
rights, even if that group is corporate or labor union in form.
Austin was a notable diversion from the Court's recognition
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that First Amendment rights and protections extend to
71
Shortly after Austin, Congress
everyone, even corporations.
took advantage of the judicial support for banning corporate
and union independent expenditures and enacted the McCainFeingold law ("BCRA").

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
Immediately after the BCRA was enacted, it faced its
first challenge in the courts in McConnell v. Federal Election
72
Commission. In McConnell, multiple plaintiffs asserted that
section 203 of the BCRA was an unconstitutional restriction on
free speech because the statute's prohibition of "electioneering
communications" was applied to more than just express
73
The Court rejected this argument and held that
advocacy.
section 203 was facially constitutional because the rationale for
regulating corporate independent expenditures that were
express advocacy could also be applied to ads that are "the
fun ctional equivalent of express advocacy. " 74 The Court based
its holding in McConnell on the presumption that these types of
expenditures could have the same kind of "corrosive and
distorting effect" on the electorate as the expenditures
specifically prohibited under Austin, and extending that
restriction would serve the government's compelling interest in
75
countering those effects. Even though the Supreme Court did
not elaborate on the definition of "functional equivalent," they
based their opinion on the district court 's determination that the
BCRA targeted only broadcast ads because those ads are the
most effective form of communicating an electioneering
message and therefore posed the greatest risk of corruption. 76
Even though the Court declared § 203 to be facially
constitutional with regard to the McConnell ads, it opened the
door to future "as-applied" challenges and remarked that such
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77

challenges could be successful on a case-by-case basis. The
first successful as-applied challenge came four years later
in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. 78 Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a non-profit
corporation, wished to use its general treasury funds to pay for
television advertisements on the issue of the US Senate
79
filibuster of Bush administration judicial nominees.
The ads
were to be broadcast during the period prohibited by the BCRA
- the period immediately freceding the reelection of Wisconsin
Senator Russ Feingold. 8 WRTL admitted that some of the
81
funds to be used for the ads had come from corporate donors.
The Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion in

WRTL. Rather, the Court splintered into three lines of
reasoning. The opinion that is considered the lead opinion,
written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justice Alito,
provided that the determination in McConnell - that section
203 could constitutionally prohibit ads that were the
82
"functional equivalent" of express advocacy - was still valid.
However, Justice Roberts elaborated on that interpretation by
stating that, "a court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
83
or against a specific candidate. "
When this new test was
applied to the ads to be broadcast by WRTL, the Court found
that they were not the functional equivalent of express
advocacy because they took a position on a legislative issue
and urged the public to contact their representatives rather than
.
specifically advocating for or agamst
a cand 1.d ate. 84
Importantly, the ads didn ' t "mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger" or "[take] a position on a
85
candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office."
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with the
functional equivalency test utilized by Justice Roberts, but
concurred with Roberts' determination that section 203 was
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unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads. 86 As a result of
their concurrence, Justice Robert's test was identified as the
87
Shortly after the WRTL case was
holding in the case.
decided, the FEC
federal regulations to codify
8
Justice Roberts's rationale.
As a result of the Court's holdings in Austin,
McConnell, and WRTL, when the Court was asked to evaluate
the validity of a statutory restriction on corporate speech in
Citizens United, it was faced with two separate but conflicting
lines of precedent: the pre-Austin line that repeatedly struck
down restrictions on free speech based on the speaker's
corporate identity and a post-Austin line that said it would be
acceptable to limit the speech of corporations and unions in
certain circumstances. Before looking at how the Court
resolved this dilemma, it is important to review the specific
sections of the McCain-Feingold statute that were at issue.

THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM LAW
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign
89
Reform Act ("BCRA"), otherwise known as the McCainFeingold Act. The McCain-Feingold Act was one of the most
far-reaching overhauls of campaign finance law since the
1970' s and in broad terms, it banned unlimited corporate
donations to national political party committees, put limitations
on advertising by organizations not affiliated with parties, and
banned the use of corporate and union money for
"electioneering communications" - ads that name a federal
candidate - within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of
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a general election. 90 The sponsor of the bill, John McCain,
stated that the BCRA,
" . .. seeks to reform the way we finance
campaigns for federal office in three major
ways. First, BCRA prohibits the national
political parties from raising or spending "soft
money" (large contributions, often from
corporations or labor unions, not permitted in
federal elections), and it generally bans state
parties from using soft money to finance federal
election campaign activity. Second, it increases
the hard money contribution limits set by the
1974 amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act ("FECA"). Finally, the new law
prohibits corporations and unions from using
soft money to finance broadcast campaign ads
close to federal elections (though corporations
and unions can finance these ads with hard
money through their political action
committees), and it requires individuals and
unincorporated groups to disclose their spending
on these ads. The law represents the most
comprehensive congressional reform of our
federal campaign finance system since FECA
91
was enacted and amended in the 1970s."
By passing the BCRA, Congress was hoping to stop the
unregulated flow of soft money and return the world of
campaign finance regulation to its pre-Watergate position
where there were defined prohibitions and limits on
92
contributions to political parties.
The BCRA was the end
result of "a protracted six-year legislative and political
struggle"; however, as President Bush was signing the bill into
law, the first wave of more than a dozen lawsuits challenging
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its constitutionality were already crashing upon the Supreme
s·mce the BCRA's enactment, the Supreme
Court has heard several cases addressing various campaign
finance issues regulated therein, but none of these cases have
been as controversial or had the impact on campaign finance
law as Citizens United.

electioneering communication at issue, then the organization
responsible for the communication must disclosure that
organization "is responsible for the content of th1s
. . , 103
a dvert1smg.

The specific BCRA provisions at issue in Citizens
United were sections 201 , 203 and 311 94 , all of which served
as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
95
("FECA").
Section 203 of BCRA regulates using corporate
funds for "electioneering communications. " 96 In general, an
electioneering communication was identified as a "broadcast
cable, or satellite" communications made within 60 days of
general election or 30 days of a primary election. 97 Section
203 continues by restricting corporations and labor unions from
funding electioneering communications from their general
funds except under certain specific circumstances such as get.
98
'
out-the-vote campatgns.
Even though certain types of
"electioneering communications" are permissible, they are
subject to BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements that
are delineated under sections 201 and 311.

Citizens United is a non-profit corporation with an
104
The corporation
annual budget of about $12 million.
acquires the majority of these funds via donations from
individuals; however, it receives donations from for-profit
·
u mte
· d
corporations as well. 1o5 In January 200 8 , c·tttzens
released a 90-minute documentary examining the record,
policies, and character of the then-Presidential Democrat
106
The documentary,
primary candidate Hillary Clinton.
Hillary: The Movie, examined "Hillary Clinton's pohtlcal
107
background in a critical light" , and mainly
on
aspects of Hillary' s political career: (1) the finng of certam
White House staff during her husband's presidency, (2)
retaliation against a woman who accused her husband of sexual
harassment, (3) violations of finance restrictions during her
Senate campaign, (4) her husband's abuse of presidential
pardon power, and (5) her record on various political
issues." 108 The film was to be released in theaters and on
DVD; however, Citizens United desired a broader distribution
and arranged to have the movie broadcast on cable through
v1"deo-on-d eman d . 109

Court , s shores. 93

Section 201 of BCRA contains a donor disclosure
provision for electioneering communications. 99 Persons who
disburse an aggregate of $10,000 or more a year for the
production and airing of electioneering communications are
required to file a statement with the Federal Election
. . (
100
Commtsston
FEC).
The statement must include the names
and addresses of persons who have contributed in excess of
$1 ,000 to accounts funding the communication. 10 1
BCRA's section 311 contains a disclaimer provision for
electioneering communications. 102 If the candidate or the
candidate's political committee did not authorize the

CITIZENS UNITED & HILLARY: THE MOVIE

Since the documentary was to be broadcast during
Clinton's presidential primary campaign, Citizens Unite? was
aware that its movie and advertising might be constdered
electioneering communications and would be subject to
.
BCRA's sections 201, 203 and 3 l l. 110 As a preempttve
stn"ke,
Citizens United sought an injunction to block the FEC from
enforcing those sections on the grounds they violated the First
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 111 To Citizens United's
disappointment, the broadcast was banned when the Federal
Elections Commission declared that the broadcast would
violate various provisions of the BCRA. 112 Since the BCRA 's
drafters anticipated the likelihood of lawsuits questioning its
113
validity , it contains a provision that specifically addresses
constitutional challenges to its various prohibitions. 114 This
provision requires that these claims be brought before a threejudge panel of the United States District Court for the District
115
of Columbia.
Appeals from this court go directly to the
U mted states Supreme Court. 116
As a result of these
jurisdictional restrictions, Citizens United went to the District
Court for injunctive relief but its application was denied. 117
Citizens United immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.
0

Supreme Court Elects to Examine the BCRA on its Face
When analyzing the numerous arguments presented in
Citizens United, the Court determined that "in the exercise of
judicial responsibility," it needed to examine the validity of the
BCRA on its face, and not on the narrower grounds suggested
by the litigants and the holdings of earlier decisions, because to
do so would lead to further litigation and, in the interim,
political speech would be chilled. 118
The Court rejected
Citizens United's as-applied challenges based on the finding
that the documentary Hillary The Movie was the functional
equivalent of express advocacy because it was essentially a
"feature-l_ength negative _advertisement that
viewers to
vote agamst Senator Clmton for President." 1 9 The Court
further rejected the contention that it should create an asapplied exception for documentary films because to do so
would require it to redraw constitutional lines for different
120
types of media, which could have the unintended result of
chilling political speech. 121
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The Court correctly noted that if it applied the test
established in Austin (the anti-distortion test), instead of
examining the statute on its face, it could "produce the
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence" of banning
political speech emanating from media corporations. 122 While
noting that media corporations were technically exempt from
123
the corporate expenditure ban set forth in section 441 b , the
Court observed that media corporations also accumulate
immense wealth with the help of the corporate form and that
"the views expressed by media corporations often ' have little
. to the pu bl"IC ' s support , r10r th ose vtews.
.
, 124
or no correIat10n
As the Court went on to observe, the " line between the media
and others who wish to comment on political and social issues
has become far more blurred" with the advent of the Internet,
blogs, and cable television, and the decline of traditional print
and broadcast media. 125 Within the context of this dilemma,
the Court recognized that making distinctions between media
corporations and non-media corporations would be difficult at
126
best.
Analyzing the statute on case-by-case basis could have
the unfortunate result of exempting a corporation that owns
both media and non-media businesses, while simultaneously, a
wholly non-media corporation could be forbidden to speak
even though it may have the same interests. 127 Such a resu lt
cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
Last, after the Court examined the morass of existing
legislation, FEC advisory opm10ns, explanations and
justifications, and FEC regulations governing the universe of
campaign finance, it concluded that the existing complicated
regulatory scheme acted as a prior restraint on speech in the
harshest of terms. 128 As such, the Court determined that the
proper adjudication required it to finally consider the
facial validity of section 441 b of the BCRA, and whether
courts should continue to adhere to Austin and the relevant
portion of McConnell. 129
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Justice Kennedy's First Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment provides that, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 130 It is
undisputable that free speech is an "essential mechanism of
democracy" because one of its many benefits is that it affords
citizens the opportunity to hold their elected officials
131
As such, the "First Amendment 'has its fullest
accountable.
and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office." 132 The Supreme Court has
already recognized that the "discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our
133
Thus, in this context, if the First Amendment
Constitution."
is to mean anything, it must mean that the government is not
permitted to fine or imprison citizens or associations of citizens
merely for engaging in political speech. 134
Recognizing the above to be true, it is a natural
progression to hold that political speech must be protected
from
that are
to. ei.ther
suppress it,
or do s.o madvertently.
For 1t IS political speech, emanating
from d1verse sources, that provides the voters with some of the
information necessary to decide which candidates to support. 136
Every first-year law student learns that laws that burden
speech, even political speech, will be subject to "strict
. "
. b
137
scrutmy review y the Court. In order to successfully make
it past this review the government will be required demonstrate
that the law " furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored" to promote that interest. 138 In Citizens United the
'
Supreme Court recognized that on rare occasions it has upheld
a "narrow class of speech restrictions" that do infringe on a
speaker's First Amendment rights; however, in all these cases,
the Court found a compelling governmental interest. 139
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The Court did not find a compelling interest in Citizens
United. 140 Justice Kennedy observed that the Court has a long
history of holding that corporations are entitled to the rights
141
recognized under the First Amendment.
These rights
142
include political speech. First Amendment protections do not
vanish merely because the speaker is a corporation. As the
Court correctly recognized, "speech restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content." 143 "The concept that the government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment." 144 Here, the Court recognized that the FEC
set in place a complicated process whereby it, and it alone,
would select what political speech is safe for dissemination to
it employed a series of
the public, and in so
14
subjective and ambiguous tests.
Such a scheme would act as
a prior restraint and an unprecedented governmental intrusion
146
on the right to speak, the likes of which cannot be sustained.
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to
others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or
class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,
.
. 147
"The
standmg,
and respect fior the speak er ' s voice.
Government may not by these means deprive the public of the
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and
148
speakers are worthy of consideration." Moreover, the Court
recognized that upholding the statute and allowing the
government to ban corporations from engaging in political
speech could result in suppression of speech in other media
150
such as books, 149 blogs, or social networking websites.
The
government's interest in leveling the political influence playing
field between individuals and corporations was unconvincing
when one considers that a " mere 24 individuals contributed an
151
astounding total of $142 million" during the 2008 election.
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Simultaneously, other like-minded citizens who have organized
under the corporate form were prohibited from having their
voices heard. The Court rightly concluded that the First
Amendment is part of the foundation for the freedom to
exchange ideas, and the public must be able to use all kinds of
forums to share those ideas without fear of governmental
reprisal. 152

WHAT DOES THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE LOOK LIKE POST-CITIZENS
UNITED?
As mentioned at the outset of this article, Citizens
United caused an eruption of criticism about the holding 's
impact on the world of campaign finance and the potential
corruptive influence of corporations and unions on the political
153
Critics of the decision should take some comfort in
process.
the reality that Citizens United will likely have less of a
negative impact, if at all, than originally feared.
First, while some early supporters of the BCRA touted
that its provisions barred corporations and unions from funding
154
political ads , in reality, the BCRA merely required
that corporations and unions finance the ads through their
PACs or similar voluntarily financed segregated funds.
155
PAC's were exempted under the BCRA, and even though
they were complicated to create and manage, they did afford
corporations a forum to participate in the political process. 156
So, as long as corporations and unions collected campaign
funds from their members with the member 's informed
consent, these entities could continue to influence elections and
some experts even expected the number of ads to increase after
157
Moreover, even though
the passage of the BCRA.
corporations and unions are no longer prohibited from
engaging in independent expenditures in support of or against
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political candidates, their participation in elections remains
For example, direct contributions by
highly regulated.
corporations and unions are still prohibited under federal law
and under the laws of 24 states. 158 A corporation or union still
cannot donate corporate money directly to, or coordinate their
159
political spending with, candidates for political office.
The
laws requiring specific notices or disclaimers on political
advertising remains untouched by Citizens United. 160 There is
still a myriad of disclosure laws governing independent
expenditures and electioneering communications on the part of
.
.
16 1 Th us, even 1
"f a corpora t.IOn or
corporatiOns
and umons.
union were to independently expend funds in support of a
candidate, money that is donated to the corporation for the
purpose of financing said expenditures would be subject to the
disclosure laws. 162 And last, despite President Obama's
declaration that foreign entities will now have greater influence
on American elections, foreign corporations and their
163
subsidiaries are still subject to the existing spending bans.
What has not been widely discussed is that Citizens
United has spawned a new wave of litigation concerning
several other aspects of the BCRA. For example, two federal
courts issued campaign finance law decisions in the spring of
2010 that can trace their origins back to Citizens United. In
SpeechNow.Org v. FEC 164, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
was asked to weigh in on the constitutionality of the BCRA's
contribution limitations and disclosure requirements as applied
to contributions to a PAC. The court held that, since the
expenditures themselves do not corrupt, it should follow that;
contributions to groups that plan to make those expenditures
will not lead to com1ption either. 165 But this unfettered right to
donate to a group like SpeechNow does not extend to the right
to donate to an actual political party. As such, "under current
law, outside groups - unlike candidates and political parties may receive unlimited donations to both advocate in favor of

2012 I Corporate Expenditures 122
political candidates and to sponsor issue ads." 166 This
particular dilemma was raised in the second case -Republican
National Committee v. FEC. 167 In the Republican National
Committee case, the RNC challenged the BCRA's soft-money
ban claiming that it had the right to raise and spend unlimited
amounts of money on all kinds of election-related issues 168 and
that the ban discriminates against the national political
169
parties.
The court held that plaintiffs' claims were at odds
with the Supreme Court's holding in McConnell and that the
Court's recent decision in Citizens United did not disturb the
part of McConnell's holding that addressed the constitutionality
ofBCRA's limits on contributions to political parties. 170
There are also several new issues that have been raised
as a result of the holding in Citizens United. When President
Obama "dressed down" the Supreme Court in his State of the
Union address in 2009, he, along with other critics
conveniently failed to mention the ,group that benefitted the
· · - Ia bor umons.
·
111 Skeptics could argue
most firom the dectswn
that this is because nine out of ten dollars spent on elections by
unions goes to the Democrats - Obama's party. 172 It is
interesting that the majority of the criticism of Citizens United
comes from the political left, and while they lament the
decision's impact as it relates to corporations, those same
critics often fail to mention the impact on union participation in
the electoral process. Unions admittedly spent approximately
one half billion dollars in the 2008 election, a figure that
dwarfs the spending of corporations. 173
In addition, while critics of the decision claim the
majority "piously claim it's about free speech," 174 they have sat
si lent, or in some cases applauded, as the Supreme Court relies
on First Amendment jurisprudence in cases about Internet
175
pornography , flag burning 176, topless dancing 177, cross118
.
.
burnmg , an d even the creatwn,
sale, or possession of films
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179 T
depicting animal torture for purposes of sexual ar?usa I.
o
hold that such conduct described in these cases ts worthy of
constitutional protection, yet simultaneously support the idea
that a corporation that expends its funds in support of a
political candidate should be exposed to criminal liabi lity
seems irreconcilable. Last, while political pundits and scholars
have criticized the ability of corporations to use their vast
wealth to allegedly influence elections, they rarely express the
same concern for the sudden rise of wealthy individuals who
are using their own millions to either buy an elected position
180
for themselves or use it to influence the outcome of others.
Recent political candidates like Mayor Michael Bloomberg in
New York, California Gubernatorial candidates Arnold
Schwarzenegger and Meg Whitman, New Jersey Governor
John Corzine, the Kennedy and Bush families, Connecticut
Senate candidate Linda McMahon and Florida Senate
candidate Jeff Greene, and billionaires George Soros and
Rupert Murdoch, just to name a few, have all
their own
immense financial resources in an effort to mfluence the
electorate.

While many cnttcs focus on corporations making
sizable expenditures on behalf of a candidate, they lose
of the reality that the public's participation in the pohttcal
process has changed with the advent of th.e.
For
example, given the success of Internet fundratsmg m the
presidential election, it is likely that in. future. electwns,
aggregations of smaller individual donatwns will actually
181
In his 2008
outweigh the spending of corporations.
Presidential campaign, Barack Obama raised close to a half-a.
h.
. 182 Ofth
billion dollars via Internet donatwns to ts campatgn.
.e
6.5 million donations received by Obama, 6 million were for
183
$100 or less, with the average on-line donation being $80.
According to the Federal Election Commission, the total. s.um
of individual donations of $200 or less to all pollttcal
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candidates in the 2008 election exceeded that of contributions
from individual donors who gave more than $2,000. I84 In fact,
to simplify and hopefully enhance this trend, some experts
have suggested new ways for individual citizens to contribute
.
b y way o f a tax credit. I 85 The proposal provides
to campaigns
that each American should be allowed a limited federal tax
credit that could only be applied if the money is donated to a
federal candidate during election years. I86 It is further posited
that, if the tax credit could be collected electronically in the
form of a credit card, debit card, or directly from a bank
account, the simplicity would increase participation and could
result in candidates paying more attention to mainstream
issues.I 87

CONCLUSION:
Citizens United, while controversial, marks the end of
more than twenty years of erosion of the First Amendment
rights of corporations and unions, particularly on the issue of
political speech. As Justice Kennedy stated, one of the
hallmarks of the First Amendment is that it should not be
applied based on the identity of the speaker. Is 8 The idea that a
speaker who engages in the political process can be imprisoned
for his or her conduct is the antithesis of what freedom of
speech is all about and sadly brings to mind regrettably similar
acts in our history such as the Alien and Sedition Acts. I89 As
noted above, there is likely to be very little change in corporate
political activities after Citizens United because corporations
have been participating in the political process despite the
existence of the BCRA. They just had to do so through their
P ACs. After the dust settles, if Congress still believes that it is
wrong to allow corporations and unions to use independent
expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate for
political office, they can certainly take appropriate action to
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address the problem unconstitutional.
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